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Oracle

Provides tamper-resistant price feeds with multi-source aggregation and circuit-breakers.

Path: oracle

Third-party documentation. This is independently authored analysis of the public Aurum Protocol codebase — not the official docs, and not reviewed or endorsed by the Aurum Protocol team.

Oracle Module

Price integrity is critical in a lending protocol. The Oracle module aggregates prices from multiple independent sources and validates them against deviation and staleness thresholds before surfacing them to other modules.

Price Sources (in priority order)

  1. Chainlink Data Feeds — primary, heartbeat 1 hour, deviation 0.5%
  2. Uniswap v3 TWAP — secondary, 30-minute window, used if Chainlink is stale
  3. Custom off-chain feed — tertiary, requires ORACLE_UPDATER_ROLE signature

Circuit Breakers

  • Staleness: any feed older than 1 hour is rejected
  • Deviation: if two sources disagree by >5%, the lower price is used and an alert event is emitted
  • Zero price: a price of 0 always reverts — no position is allowed to be valued at zero

Examples

Fetch ETH price

Fetch ETH price
typescript
const [price, updatedAt] = await oracle.getPrice(WETH_ADDRESS);
const age = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000) - Number(updatedAt);
console.log(`ETH: $${(Number(price) / 1e8).toFixed(2)} (age ${age}s)`);
STATUSexample

Price is returned as 1e8 fixed-point (matching Chainlink's native format).

Batch price fetch for health-factor computation

Batch price fetch for health-factor computation
typescript
const assets  = [WETH_ADDRESS, USDC_ADDRESS, WBTC_ADDRESS];
const [prices] = await oracle.getBatchPrices(assets);
 
assets.forEach((a, i) => {
  console.log(a, "→", (Number(prices[i]) / 1e8).toFixed(2), "USD");
});
STATUSexample

Reduces RPC calls when computing portfolio health-factor across multiple assets.

Edge Cases

  • getPrice reverts with StalePrice() if no source has been updated within the staleness window
  • getBatchPrices reverts if ANY asset in the array lacks a valid price — atomicity is intentional
  • pushPrice requires the message to be signed with a key holding ORACLE_UPDATER_ROLE; replays are blocked by a nonce
  • During a Chainlink outage, the protocol automatically downgrades to the Uniswap TWAP source

Interface

Interface
solidity
interface IOracle {
    /// @notice Returns USD price for asset, scaled to 1e8 (Chainlink convention)
    function getPrice(address asset) external view returns (uint256 price, uint64 updatedAt);
 
    /// @notice Returns prices for multiple assets in one call
    function getBatchPrices(address[] calldata assets)
        external view
        returns (uint256[] memory prices, uint64[] memory updatedAts);
 
    /// @notice Push an off-chain signed price — requires ORACLE_UPDATER_ROLE
    function pushPrice(address asset, uint256 price, bytes calldata signature) external;
 
    event PriceFetched(address indexed asset, uint256 price, uint8 source);
    event PriceDeviation(address indexed asset, uint256 price1, uint256 price2);
}
 
STATUSinterface